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References and Further Reading 1. Although his family was of comfortable means, his youth was twice marked by tragedy. In two successive years, his two younger brothers contracted an infectious disease from him—diphtheria in one case and pneumonia in the other—and died.

His remaining, older brother attended Princeton for undergraduate studies and was a great athlete. Rawls followed his brother to Princeton. Although Rawls played baseball, he was, in later life at least, excessively modest about his success at that or at any other endeavor.

Rawls continued for his Ph. From them, he learned to avoid entanglement in metaphysical controversies when possible. Turning away from the then-influential program of attempting to analyze the meaning of the moral concepts, he replaced it with what was—for a philosopher—a more practically oriented task: Hart and Isaiah Berlin. Hart had made progress in legal philosophy by connecting the idea of social practices with the institutions of the law.

Compare TJ at 48n.. In Isaiah Berlin, Rawls met a brilliant historian of political thought—someone who, by his own account, had been driven away from philosophy by the aridity of mid-century conceptual analysis. Berlin influentially traced the historical careers of competing, large-scale values, such as liberty which he distinguished as either negative or positive and equality.

Not long after his time in Oxford, Rawls embarked on what was to become a life-long project of finding a coherent and attractive way of combining freedom and equality into one conception of political justice.

This project first took the form of a series of widely-discussed articles about justice published between and There he remained, being named a University Professor in Throughout his career, he devoted considerable attention to his teaching.

In his lectures on moral and political philosophy, Rawls focused meticulously on great philosophers of the past—Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, and others—always approaching them deferentially and with an eye to what we could learn from them. Mentor to countless graduate students over the years, Rawls inspired many who have become influential interpreters of these philosophers.

The initial publication of A Theory of Justice in brought Rawls considerable renown. A Theory of Justice a. Some social institutions can provoke envy and resentment. Others can foster alienation and exploitation. Is there a way of organizing society that can keep these problems within livable limits? Can society be organized around fair principles of cooperation in a way the people would stably accept?

While fair institutions will influence the life chances of everyone in society, they will leave individuals free to exercise their basic liberties as they see fit within this fair set of rules. Utilitarianism comes in various forms. The utilitarian idea, as Rawls confronts it, is that society is to be arranged so as to maximize the total or average aggregate utility or expected well-being. In addition to developing that constructive alternative, however, Rawls also offered some highly influential criticisms of utilitarianism.

His critique of average utilitarianism will be described below. The Original Position Recognizing that social institutions distort our views by sometimes generating envy, resentment, alienation, or false consciousness and bias matters in their own favor by indoctrinating and habituating those who grow up under them , Rawls saw the need for a justificatory device that would give us critical distance from them. The OP is a thought experiment that asks: The Conditions and Purpose of the Original Position The OP, as Rawls designs it, self-consciously builds on the long social-contract tradition in Western political philosophy.

While Rawls is most emphatic about this in his later work, for example, PL at 75, it is clear already in TJ. He insists there that it is up to the theorist to construct the social-contract thought-experiment in the way that makes the most sense given its task of helping us select principles of justice.

The idea is to help justify a set of principles of social justice by showing that they would be selected in the OP. The OP is accordingly set up to build in the moral conditions deemed necessary for the resulting choice to be fair and to insulate the results from the influence of the extant social order. The veil of ignorance plays a crucial role in this set-up. TJ at , It would be too fanciful to think of the parties to the OP as having the capacity to invent principles.

The point of the thought experiment, rather, is to see which principles would be chosen in a fair set-up. To use the OP this way, we must offer the parties a menu of principles to choose from.

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Rawls offers them various principles to consider. Among them are his own principles to be described below and the two versions of utilitarianism, classical and average. Would rational parties behind a veil of ignorance choose average utilitarianism? The economist John Harsanyi argues that they would because it would be rational for parties lacking any other information to maximize their expectation of well-being. Harsanyi Since they do not know who they will be, they will therefore want to maximize the average level of well-being in society.

The most crucial difference concerns the motivation that is attributed to the parties by stipulation. The veil deprives the parties of any knowledge of the values—the conception of the good—of the person into whose shoes they are to imagine stepping. What, then, are they to prefer? Since Harsanyi refuses to supply his parties with any definite motivation, his answer is somewhat mysterious.

Rawls instead defines the parties as having a determinate set of motivations. The Motivations of the Parties to the Original Position The parties in the hypothetical OP are to choose on behalf of persons in society, for whom they are, in effect, trustees.

PL at 76, The veil of ignorance, however, prevents the parties from knowing anything particular about the preferences, likes or dislikes, commitments or aversions of those persons. They also know nothing particular about the society for which they are choosing. On what basis, then, can the parties choose?

To ascribe to them a full theory of the human good would fly in the face of the facts of pluralism, for such theories are deeply controversial. This is the only motivation that TJ ascribes to the parties. The parties are motivated neither by benevolence nor by envy or spite.

The former tradition attempts to imagine the point of view of a fully benevolent spectator of the human scene who reacts impartially and sympathetically to all human travails and successes. The ideal-observer theory typically imagines a somewhat more dispassionate or impersonal, but still omniscient, observer of the human scene. Each of these approaches asks us to imagine what such a spectator or observer would morally approve. Against these theories, Rawls raises a number of objections, which can be boiled down to this: Rawls was determined to get beyond this impasse.

He suggests that the OP should combine the mutual-disinterest assumption with the veil of ignorance. This combination, he argues, will achieve the rough moral equivalence of universal benevolence without either neglecting the separateness of persons or sacrificing definiteness of results. As we will see, the definite positive motivations that Rawls ascribes to the parties are crucial to explaining why they will prefer his principles to average utilitarianism.

The primary goods are supposed to be uncontroversially worth seeking, albeit not for their own sakes. Although this claim seems quite modest, philosophers rebutted it by describing life plans or worldviews for which one or another of the primary goods is not useful.

These counterexamples revealed the need for a different rationale for the primary goods. At roughly the same time, Rawls began to develop further the Kantian strand in his view. These Kantian ideas ended up providing a new rationale for the primary goods.

See CP essays 13, 16, Kant held that the true principles of morality are not imposed on us by our psyches or by eternal conceptual relations that hold true independently of us; rather, Kant argued, the moral law is a law that our reason gives to itself.

It is, in this sense, self-chosen or autonomous law.

Jones chooses to believe it does. Once it is so set up the parties are to choose principles. Their task of choosing principles thus models the idea of autonomy. The parties to the OP, in selecting principles, implement this idea of autonomy. How they represent equality and rationality are obvious, for they are equally situated and are rational by definition.

Reasonableness enters the OP not principally by the rationality of the parties but by the constraints on them—most especially the veil of ignorance.

To conceive of persons as reasonable and rational, then, is to conceive of them as having certain higher-order powers. Second, we can also revise our ends when we see reason to do so. The parties are conceived as having highest-order interests that correspond directly to these highest-order powers. Although the account of the moral powers was present in TJ, it is only in his later works that Rawls uses this idea to defend and elaborate the motivation of the parties in the OP.

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In various, complicated ways, in his later work, Rawls defends the primary goods as being required for free and equal citizens to promote and protect their three moral powers. This is to cast the primary goods as items objectively needed by moral persons occupying the role of free and equal citizens. In Political Liberalism, Rawls describes the motivation as: In addition, they are concerned with securing for the person they represent the higher-order interests we have in developing and exercising our … moral powers and in securing the conditions under which we can further our determinate conceptions of the good, whatever it is.

His aim remains, nonetheless, to assemble in the OP a series of relatively uncontroversial, relatively fixed points among our considered moral judgments and to build an argument on that basis for the superiority of some principles of justice over others. These principles address two different aspects of the basic structure of society: The second principle addresses instead those aspects of the basic structure that shape the distribution of opportunities, offices, income, wealth, and in general social advantages.

Each of these three centrally addresses a different set of primary goods: That the view adequately secures the social basis of self-respect is something that Rawls argues more holistically.

The Argument from the Original Position The argument that the parties in the OP will prefer Justice as Fairness to utilitarianism and to the various other alternative principles with which they are presented divides into two parts.

There is, first, the question whether the parties will insist upon securing a scheme of equal basic liberties and upon giving them top priority.

Regarding the first part of the argument from the OP, the crucial point is that the parties are stipulated to care about rights and liberties.